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Abstract:
The assignment of rights to as low political levels as possible recommends itself because
preferences of citizens are better known at the communal, provincial or state level, be-
cause their inﬂuence is greater, political powers are more distributed and since decen-
tralization furthers efﬁciency and innovation in a system. Thus subsidiarity requires
that only the necessary framework and those decisions related to cases with strong ex-
ternalities or to public goods covering the whole society are taken at the highest level.
Looking from this perspective at the Lisbon Treaty proposed for the European Commu-
nity several important shortcomings are found which are mainly related to the ﬁelds of
overlapping competencies of the Union and the member states. It is shown that the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, which has to be safeguarded by introducing adequate institutions,
would be much better served by the proposals of the European Constitutional Group.
1. Deﬁnition of and Reasons for Subsidiarity
By subsidiarity we understand the assignment of the rights to take decisions
to as low a level of society as is appropriate for the wellbeing of citizens. This
implies that as many decisions as possible are left to individuals and to the
organizations and institutions formed by them at their own discretion. All tasks
that cannot be handled adequately at this level are assigned to communities like
villages and cities, or following similar criteria to cantons, Länder or states, then
to nations and only to international federations like the EU as a last remaining
level. Several reasons exist for an assignment of decision rights following the
principle of subsidiarity:
a. The lower the level of decision-making the more the preferences of indi-
viduals are known and can be taken into account.
b. The smaller the number of people involved in the decision-making process,
the greater their inﬂuence that outcomes are brought about which weigh
their preferences and situations.
c. The more decentralized the rights to take decisions the more efﬁcient and
innovative the system, provided that enough competition and no external-
ities or important economies of scale or scope exist.1 However, competi-
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tion can at least partly only be secured by a framework monitored at a
higher level. Note also that any collective decision-making, for instance
by majority voting, implies negative externalities in the form of outvoted
minorities.
d. The chances that powers are misused are more restricted.
For the practical application of the principle of subsidiarity several important
questions arise:
1. Who should have the right to assign and, if necessary, to re-assign de-
cision-making rights to different levels of society? It is obvious that in the
beginning the distribution of these rights has to be determined by a con-
stitution or treaty (treaties). But even then remains the problem on who
should have the right to change them and to judge whether the constitu-
tion or treaty (treaties) have been violated.
2. Which externalities and economies of scale or scope should be taken into
account in assigning decision rights to higher political levels, given the
problems of less information, efﬁciency and information, the negative ex-
ternalities of outvoted minorities and the danger of the misuse of power at
higher levels?
In the present paper we are only concerned with the application of the sub-
sidiarity principle between the EU and its member states. We will thus mainly
analyze the arrangements for subsidiarity in the Lisbon Treaty, which are in
our view rather inadequate, and those proposed by the European Constitutional
Group (ECG).
2. The Subsidiarity Arrangements Contained in the
Lisbon Treaty
To establish and to maintain a free, economically efﬁcient, innovative and there-
fore wealthy society, it is of the greatest importance to limit as far as possible
the jurisdiction of the European Union. The same principle should, of course,
also rule decisions on the competencies of member states vis-a-vis their citizens,
but this is not our present subject. Though it is clear that the EU needs to have
the competence to remove and to prevent any obstacles to the free movement of
people, goods, services and capital within the Union, or for Europe-wide environ-
mental problems, there are no reasons to harmonise pension systems or taxes.
Such a limitation of the EU’s jurisdiction also implies that its institutions, that
is the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the European
Court have no right to increase their jurisdictional domain and that they have
to be monitored by adequate and independent institutions. For it is obvious that
among several states for the rise of Europe. This theory of the beneﬁcial consequences of systems
competition has been revived and empirically supported during the last decades. See the intro-
ductions to the volumes edited by Bernholz, Streit and Vaubel (1998) and Bernholz and Vaubel
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an expansion of the Union’s competencies will in general be favoured by the
Commission, the European Court, the European Parliament (at least the single
chamber foreseen by the Convention’s proposal) and in many cases also by the
European Council.
Looking at the proposals contained in the Lisbon Treaty from the subsidiar-
ity perspective, we can state that, on the whole, it assigns meaningful decision
rights to the EU as far as its exclusive competences are concerned (AEUV, Article
3(1)):
a) Customs Union,
b) Rules for competition necessary for the functioning of the internal market,
c) Monetary policies for the members of the European Monetary System,
d) Maintaining the biological wealth of the seas in its common ﬁsheries
policy,
e) Common trade policy.
In AEUV, Article 3(2) the exclusive competence of the Union for concluding in-
ternational treaties is granted under some limiting conditions.
However, even here any rule is missing obliging the EU to work for as much
freedom as possible concerning the free movement of goods, services and capital
with the outside world.
The principle of subsidiarity is clearly violated, when the area of shared com-
petences is considered, that is the area where both the member states and the
Union can legislate. In this case we ﬁnd a bundle of ﬁelds where the Union
should not have any or at least only strictly limited jurisdiction (AEUV, Arti-
cle 4(1)). Mentioned are transportation, energy, social policies, environment,
research, technological development and space exploration.
Even if one can agree that the Union should play a certain role in planning
transcontinental transportation networks, why should this be true for the whole
of transportation? Turning to social policies, it is certainly required to establish
common rules such that beneﬁts accumulated in one member state will be pre-
served in case of an emigration to another. For otherwise the free movement of
people would be hindered. But other rules, for instance granting each citizen
a right to all beneﬁts in any member state to which he or she moved without
adequate earlier contributions are more than dubious. For this would lead to a
movement of people quite independent of any motivation to work and a (an even
earlier) breakdown of national social security, like old age pension systems. It
would also lead to higher unemployment in countries with higher social security
levels.
A role of the Union concerning environmental protection can only be justiﬁed
if the problems are of a Europe-wide or even wider nature. And an intervention
of the Union to protect consumers is only justiﬁed, if the free movement of goods
and services is hindered. But this is already today a task of the European Court,
and should remain solely its jurisdiction.
Finally, why should the EU have competences for research, technological de-
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projects, which were so big that they could not be ﬁnanced otherwise and not be
accomplished by a free collaboration of several member states.
Even worse, according to AEUV, Art. 6 the EU has the competence to as-
sist, coordinate or supplement measures of the member states in the ﬁelds of pro-
tecting and improving human health, industry, culture, tourism, general and
professional education, youth and sport, protection against catastrophes and ad-
ministrative collaboration. These measures have to imply European ends.
It is absolutely unclear, why these areas should not be left to the competi-
tion of member states, communities or even citizens themselves, and why such
measures taken by the EU would not contradict the principle of subsidiarity.
The proposed rules concerning coordination of economic and employment
policies (AEUV, Titles X and XVIII) may also turn out to be dangerous. This
is especially the case for paragraphs which state ﬁrst that the Union shall adopt
measures to ensure coordination of the employment policies of the Member States,
in particular by providing guidelines for these policies; and second that the Union
may adopt initiatives to ensure coordination of Member States’ social policies.
Quite in contrast to these proposals, the principles of a free and productive soci-
ety require according to our understanding not harmonisation but a competition
of national systems. We are convinced that such competition would reach much
better the aims of high employment and of social security systems which could
be maintained in the long run. With the help of systems competition it would
also soon be revealed which institutional frameworks were better suited to reach
high employment. By contrast, a co-ordination or harmonisation of social poli-
cies following for instance the standards of France or Germany would lead to
catastrophic consequences. Consider as an example setting European minimum
wages at such levels. This would lead to a massive increase of unemployment in
the poorer member states, consequently to a strong migration towards wealthier
countries increasing even further their level of unemployment and the deﬁcits
of unemployment insurance.
This picture of only vaguely deﬁned and excessive jurisdictions of the Euro-
pean Union contradicting the principle of subsidiarity is crowned by article 2(2).
Here it is stated that in all cases of shared jurisdiction the member states only
use their rights, if and in so far the union has not used her competency.
Let us sum up. The Lisbon Treaty clearly violates the principle of subsidiar-
ity concerning the distribution of decision rights between the EU and her mem-
ber states. It does so by assigning an incredibly broad range of shared jurisdic-
tion, in which, moreover, the member states can only become active if the EU
does not act.
But given this dismal picture advocates of the treaty may argue that the
subsidiarity principle is safeguarded by other clauses contained in it. And in-
deed it is stated in EUV article 5(3) that the union will only become active in
the domain of shared jurisdiction if and so far the measures considered can-
not be sufﬁciently realized by the member states, and can be better realized by
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the union apply the subsidiarity principle according the rules contained in the
protocol.
The protocol contains the following rules: Each newly proposed bill has to be
sent to the national parliaments together with an explanation why it does not
violate the subsidiarity principle and why the proposed measures can be better
realized by the union. If at least one third of the parliaments of the member
states provides arguments that the principle of subsidiarity has been violated,
the Commission has to check whether this is indeed the case. If it decides that
the complaints are not valid it passes the bill on to the European Council and
the European Parliament. They pass the bill if they think that no violation has
taken place. In that case the member states or their parliaments can ﬁnally
take refuge to a law suit, so that the European Court ﬁnally decides whether
the principle of subsidiarity has been violated.
Such are the controls provided by the treaty to prevent that the subsidiar-
ity principle has not been violated. Though the European Constitutional Group
(ECG) admits that the rules for securing subsidiarity have been strengthened
compared to the status quo by provisions contained in the treaty, they are still
deplorably inadequate. For they grant the decisions whether the principle of
subsidiarity has been violated to the Commission, the European Council and
the European Parliament and ﬁnally to the European Court, that is to organs
of the EU which are themselves interested in increasing their powers by en-
larging their competencies. This means that the institutional framework for
safeguarding the principle of subsidiarity is not only violated by the assignment
of decision-making rights in the domain of shared competencies, but also by the
set-up of the monitoring process.
3. The Proposals of the European Constitutional Group
for Safeguarding Subsidiarity
After the rejection of the proposal for a European Constitution by the citizens
of France and the Netherlands the ECG has sent a revised treaty containing
its proposals to the governments of the member states.2 In Article 6, The Scope
and Form of Legislation, of this proposal it has described its view of an adequate
assignment of rights following the principle of subsidiarity. Each paragraph is
followed by a comment. Let me quote this article and the comments:
(i) In carrying out its tasks, the Union will not legislate in cases where the
public policy concerned can be carried out by Member States acting indi-
vidually or in small groupings or where methods of coordination can be
used that do not require the passage of Union laws.
2 European Constitutional Group 2003. For presentations of the proposals of the ECG see Bernholz
1994 and 2003. The ECG is a private and independent group of members from different European
countries, mainly professors of law and economics.332 Peter Bernholz
This article on the general demarcation of powers and responsibilities creates a
presumption in favour of the most local jurisdiction and in favour of the least
onerous form of legislation, including the use of private market solutions.
(ii) The laws of the Union shall provide general legislative frameworks, leaving
to the Member States the choice and form of methods for achieving results
with comparable effect (directives). The Union will also be able to enact
measures that are directly applicable in all Member States (regulations).
This deﬁnes the legal instruments of the Union in terms of the traditional dis-
tinction between a ‘directive’ and a ‘regulation’.
(iii) The laws of the Union will apply only to cross border transactions between
members, will give priority to mutual recognition of laws in the Member
States and shall not pre-empt Member State legislation in the same ﬁeld
other than on matters agreed in respect of external trade policy.
This provision limits the law-making authority of the Union so as to give a gen-
eral protection to the law-making capacity of localities, regions and Member
States so that they can reﬂect the preferences of their voters. Speciﬁc protec-
tions follow.
The term ‘cross border transactions’ should be understood to apply for ex-
ample to immigration and pollution and not just to goods and services. The
provision limits the law making authority in this way because other criteria are
too vague to offer judicial protection against the overstepping of powers (for ex-
ample whether actions in one member state ‘affect’ another).
(iv) The Union will have no powers to interfere with the freedom of contract
unless such contracts restrain competition.
This provision places a speciﬁc restriction on Union activities in order to pro-
tect a basic market principle. In particular, the power to regulate or deregulate
labour markets is to rest with Member States in order to allow Member States
the greatest possible ﬂexibility to achieve full employment as well as to learn
from best practice.
(v) Matters concerning the tax systems of Member States or the rates and levels
at which taxes are levied are to be decided within each Member State and
not by the Union or its institutions.
This means that taxes will reﬂect voter preferences in each member state. It
will prevent high tax jurisdictions exerting pressure on low tax jurisdictions to
raise their tax rates or levels.
This provision will also prevent the governments of Member States unani-
mously forming a tax cartel at the expense of citizens. Tax collusion raises the
citizens’ cost of legal tax avoidance and thereby the average level of taxes.
(vi) In cases where Union laws are envisaged they shall be prepared and im-
plemented according to the following procedures:
Any proposed law with a signiﬁcant economic effect (including those en-
visaged as part of an international treaty or commitment) must be sup-
ported by an assessment of its impact and a justiﬁcation of why Union lawHow to Safeguard Subsidiarity and Competition in the European Union 333
rather than other methods of achieving comparable results including mar-
ket remedies has to be chosen.
The assessments must be made publicly available in time for independent
peer review as well as democratic scrutiny.
The assumptions on which the assessments have been carried out must also
be made public so that the assessments can be reproduced in the scrutiny
process.
The provision preventing tax collusion has also the effect to allow systems com-
petition in this ﬁeld which, according to empirical studies, leads to a more ef-
ﬁcient allocation of public resources. One other safeguard against an ever in-
creasing centralization which has been observed historically in all federal states
is the proposal to allow no European taxes (Article 8, II).
Finally we have to discuss the question how the ECG proposes to limit the
ever present and perhaps creeping and hidden tendencies for an enlargement
of the competencies of the EU. This is especially important since the rules con-
tained in Article 6 are necessarily not very speciﬁc. Two institutional proposals
have been made besides the negation of European taxes. First the creation of
a second chamber of parliament, the Chamber of Parliamentarians (Article 4).
This chamber shall be composed of representatives of national parliaments se-
lected by lot. It shall have the power to block legislation. Since it is composed
of members of the national parliaments it is expected that it uses this right to
prohibit legislation proposing an unwarranted extension of the powers of the EU
violating the principle of subsidiarity.
A second institutional proposal to safeguard the principle of subsidiarity is
the creation of a European Court of Review, which shall hear all cases potentially
involving the distribution of competencies between the Union and the Member
States (Article 6). It shall be composed of justices designated by the highest
courts of the Member States for a maximum period of six years.
Only persons can become judges at this court who are at the same time a
judge of a supreme court of a member state. This provision shall secure that
the judges look at the cases to be decided from the perspective of the member
states. Moreover, to detect, as far as possible, any violation of the principle of
subsidiarity, it is proposed that any citizen, member state or institution of the
Union may raise a case in the Court or request a preliminary ruling in advance
of an actual case. The Court has the right to decide whether or not to accept a
case or a request for a preliminary ruling.
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